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ABSTRACT 
This paper makes a comparative analysis between the Indian 
Maritime Zones Act, 1976 and the Draft Treaty on the Law of the Sea. 
The Treaty will constrict the rights of the coastal state to control 
overflight and navigation of foreign vessels in the exclusive economic 
zone and on the continental shelf. It will also impose obligations on 
the coastal state beyond those enumerated in the Indian Maritime Zones 
Act. The Treaty however, will still deserve to be ratified and 
supported by India because the advantages of ratification will greatly 
outweigh the disadvantages. 
MARITIME ZONES ACT, 1976 AND THE DRAFT TREATY: 
THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION 
Manjula R. Shyam 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS Ill) is likely to conclude in 1981 with a comprehensive 
treaty. The treaty, if ratified by a (yet to be determined) majority 
of states, will codify certain current practices, create new law 
regarding the use of the oceans, and establish an international oceans 
regime. Each state will then have to decide if it should ratify the 
comprehensive treaty. The treaty will be a single package, the 
product of tortuous and lengthy negotiations involving many different 
uses and classes of users. Many times on its stormy journey towards 
conclusion, UNCLOS III seemed to flounder on rocky shoals of self-
interest but the awareness of the significance of the ocean resources 
and of the process of resolving conflicting interests by international 
negotiations forced the participants to make compromises that averted 
disaster. A refusal to ratify the treaty by a large number of states 
will prompt others to take unilateral actions that will lead to a 
chaotic and conflict prone ocean regime. The effects of non-
ratification will extend beyond ocean related matters. It will mean a 
serious setback to the process of codification and development of law 
and to conflict resolution through international negotiations and 
diplomacy. These effects of non-ratification will plague the 
international community for many years to come in many different 
areas. 
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In most states, ratification of the treaty (as opposed to the 
negotiation) will involve a larger set of decision-makers than were 
involved in its negotiation. Many of these participants are not 
likely to have international order in general or the ocean regime in 
specific as their major preoccupation. The rights bestowed and duties 
imposed by the treaty will surely undergo careful scrutiny within the 
domestic context of each state. An understanding of the nature of the 
privileges and obligations that will accrue to a state under the 
treaty will decrease the chances of their being repudiated at a later 
date. It is with this perspective_ that I make the following 
comparison between the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 of India1' 
(hereafter referred to as the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 or simply the 
1976 Act) and the Draft Convention,on the Law of the Sea2 (hereafter 
referred to as the Draft Treaty) which is expected to be very similar 
to the Treaty that states will be asked to ratify. My objective here 
is not to comment on every provision of the Maritime Zones Act 1976 or 
of the Draft Treaty which deals with the territorial waters, 
continental shelf or exclusive economic zone because such analysis has 
already been done in many books and articles. Instead, my goal is to 
examine the differences between the rights and duties that will accrue 
to India as a result of Treaty ratification and those claimed by India_ 
under the Maritime Zones Act, 1976. Such a comparison may provide a 
basis for deciding whether or not India should ratify the Treaty. 
Though India actively participated in the First Law of the Sea 
Conference held in Geneva in 1958, she never ratified any of the four 
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conventions that resulted from that conference. Reasons for India's 
failure to ratify these conventions have never been analyzed at any 
length. Are there reasons for India to ratify the product of the 
Third Law of the Sea Conference? How does UNCLOS III differ from 
UNCLOS I? Do these differences matter to India? One last caveat is 
in order here. The purview of the 1976 Act is more limited than that 
of the Draft Treaty because the Act does not concern itself with 
straits, archipelagic states, high seas, rights of access of the 
landlocked states to and from the sea and freedom of transit and the 
resources and management of the seabed area beyond national 
jurisdiction. Those sections of the Treaty may in themselves 
constitute sufficient grounds to decide on ratification, however, they 
will not be examined here. In this paper I focus attention on those 
sections of the Draft Treaty on which India has adopted specific 
rights through the Maritime Zones Act of 1976. I will first discuss 
the nature of the rights claimed by India in each of the maritime 
zones and then compare them with those incorporated in the Draft 
Treaty. 
TERRITORIAL SEA 
Maritime Zones Act, 1976 
Under Section 3 of the 1976 Act, the breadth of the 
territorial waters is declared to be 12 miles from the appropriate 
baseline. India has sovereign rights over the territorial waters, the 
seabed and subsoil and the airspace over such waters. 
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Rights of India 
a) All foreign ships other than warships and submarines have the 
right of innocent passage through the territorial waters 
(Article 4) . 
b) Foreign warships and submarines may pass through the 
territorial waters after giving prior notice to the 
government. All submarines have to navigate on surface and 
show their flag while passing through the territorial waters. 
c) If necessary to ensure peace, good order and security of
India, the government can suspend absolutely or with
qualifications the entry of all or any class of foreign ships
in any area of the territorial waters. 
Draft Treaty 
Part II of the Draft Treaty deals with the territorial sea. 
Article 19 enumerates twelve conditions that would make a passage 
non-innocent. By giving an operational definition of innocent 
passage, the Draft Treaty aims to reduce the realm of discretion of , 
the coastal state and at the same time lays down a code of behavior 
for ships seeking innocent passage. Article 22 provides that the 
coastal state may require foreign ships to use designated sealanes and 
prescribed traffic separation schemes. It also allows the coastal 
state to require special precautionary measures for foreign nuclear 
powered ships and ships carrying nuclear and other noxious substances. 
The coastal state may, if necessary for its security or for 
the safety of ships, suspend temporarily, in specified areas of the 
territorial sea, the innocent passage of foreign ships. Such 
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suspension will be without discrimination among foreign ships. These 
provisions of Article 25 
,
have to be read in conjunction with Article 
24, which enjoins coastal states not to discriminate in form or in 
fact against the ships of any state or against ships carrying cargoes 
to, from or on behalf of any state. 
It is useful to make a comparison between the two texts to 
review the rights of the coastal state to suspend innocent passage. 
At the outset it must be observed that the decision if a passage is 
innocent or otherwise, is made first and last by the coastal state. 
The decision of the state is not subject to the jurisdiction of a 
court or tribunal. 
Ships can be classified on the basis of destination or nature 
of vessel, or cargo, or ownership. The 1976 Act permits a selective 
suspension of passage. A certain class of ships, e. g. oil tankers 
above a certain tonnage or nuclear powered ships, may be refused 
innocent passage temporarily if so required for environmental reasons. 
The Draft Treaty allows a. suspension of all ships or none. 
The intent is twofold. A selective suspension by a coastal state 
would affect fewer states which would limit the outcry if the coastal 
state acts without proper cause. This would permit coastal states 
greate·r freedom to suspend innocent passage and perhaps enable them to 
use it more readily. If they would have to suspend it for all ships, 
they are likely to face the combined and concerted displeasure of many 
states. Though at first blush it seems that the Draft Treaty gives 
the coastal state greater power than the 1976 Act does, in practice 
the Treaty allows coastal state less freedom to exercise that power. 
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Secondly, the intention of the Draft Treaty is to prevent the coastal 
state from discriminating among ships in such a way as to single out 
one state or a group of states. Though the 1976 Act of India only 
allows restrictions on a particular "class of ships" and not against 
any particular states, it is often possible to signify a particular 
class of ships with such specificity that it would have the intended 
or unintended effect of preventing passage of ships carrying cargoes 
to from or on behalf of a particular state without affecting most 
other ships. 
The Draft Treaty only mentions suspension of innocent passage 
when it is deemed essential for the security of the coastal state. 
The 1976 Act on the other hand mentions the protection of the "peace, 
good order and security" which can encompass many more circumstances 
and is not confined to military security alone. However since the 
coastal state is the final judge of whether its security is or is not 
threatened, the exact language of this provision is unlikely to make 
much difference. 
Ratification of the Treaty by India would imply undertaking 
the duty not to discriminate among ships on the basis of any criteria. 
This would mean, reduced flexibility and therefore a restriction on 
the right enjoyed under the 1976 Act. 
The two texts also differ with respect to innocent passage of 
warships in territorial waters. The 1976 Act requires prior 
notification of the passage of all warships and submarines. The Draft 
Treaty does not expressly state that coastal states may require prior 
notification. To the contrary, Article 24 states that the coastal 
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state shall not impose requirements on foreign ships which have the 
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent 
passage. Does ratification of the treaty imply that India cannot 
require prior notification from foreign warships and submarines 
exercising the right of innocent passage in her territorial waters? 
To answer this question, it is useful to summarize the 
international law on the passage of warships in territorial waters 
other than straits. There is considerable controversy and ambiguity 
in customary law. Elihu Root wrote in 1910 "warships may not pass 
without consent into the zone, because they threaten. 113 Jessup 
regarded it as a "sound rule" and maintained that warships "should not 
enjoy an absolute legal right to pass through a State's territorial 
waters any more than an army may cross the land territory. 114 Colombos 
thinks it is reasonable to concede to a state the right to enact 
regulations regarding the passage of foreign warships. 5 McDougal and 
Burke state that the predominant expectation of states is that 
warships have a right of access to the territorial sea subject to 
notification; coastal competence does not extend to denying a right of 
access to warships.6 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 
1958 failed to put an end to this controversy. The recommendation of 
the International Law Commission entitling coastal states to require 
previous authorization or notification did not win the two-thirds 
approval at UNCLOS I. The states which wanted prior authorization for 
the passage of warships, rejected the clause which would have required 
only prior notification after they failed to obtain approval on the 
8 
authorization clause. 
Thus the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, 1958 does not specify any special provisions for the passage of 
warships. The convention obligates all states that ratified that 
convention. India did not ratify the convention. There was no 
unanimity of opinion expressed at the conference that could be 
construed as an evidence of customary law binding even those states 
which did not ratify the convention. International practice continues 
to vary. Some states have interpreted the law to mean that since the 
convention does not expressly forbid notification and since most 
states at the conference were in favor of passage of warships subject 
to prior notification, customary law supports notification and this is 
reflected in the 1976 Act of India. 
The Draft Treaty clearly rules out the requirement of prior 
authorization for warships. The question is if the Draft Treaty 
permits a coastal state to require notification or will that be 
regarded as an "impairment" of innocent passage? As we have seen 
above, customary law does not oppose prior notification and under the 
Draft Treaty a coastal state may make laws in conformity with "other 
rules of international law" (Article 2 1) .  Hence the ratification of 
the Treaty does not necessarily imply that India would have to eschew 
the notification clause in the 1976 Act. The interpretation of prior 
notification will be the critical variable. If, for example, foreign 
warships must notify 30 days in advance it may be regarded as an 
impairment but if they may notify 24 hours in advance, it may not be 
an impairment. The compatibility of the 1976 Act with the Draft 
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Treaty on the subject of notification for passage of warships and 
submarines may depend on its interpretation and its likely effect on 
the impairment of innocent passage. 
CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Maritime Zones Act, 1976 
Section 6 of the 1976 Act declares that the continental shelf 
of India comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that 
extend beyond the limit of the territorial water throughout the 
natural prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin or to a distance of 200 miles from the baselines 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to 
that distance. 
Rights of India 
Subsection 3 states that India has/can 
a) sovereign rights for purposes of exploration and exploitation 
of all resources on the shelf, 
b) exclusive rights for the construction and maintenance of 




exclusive jurisdiction to authorize and control scientific 
research, 
exclusive jurisdiction to protect the marine environment and 
prevent pollution, 
declare any area of the continental shelf and its superjacent 
water a designated area for purposes of regulating entry into 
and passage through by foreign ships by specifying traffic 
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separation schemes, 
f) extend to any part of the continental shelf or the superjacent 
waters same or similar restrictions as have been placed on any 
part of the territory of India. 
Draft Treaty 
Article 76 of the Draft Treaty defines the limit of the 
continental shelf. For states whose geological margin extends beyond 
2 0 0  miles, the outer edge of the continental margin shall be 
determined in accordance with paragraphs (4) and (5) of Article 76. 
Thus the continental shelf of India in some areas under the Draft 
Treaty may not be coterminus with the entire submerged prolongation of 
the land as described in the 1976 Act. 
The Draft Treaty imposes some limitations on the unfettered 
use of the resources of the shelf. A coastal state shall make 
payments to the Authority from exploitation of the continental shelf 
beyond 20 0 miles for distribution· to the developing countries (Article 
82) .  These payments will start from the 6th year of production, 
increase from one percent to seven percent in the 12 th year and remain 
at that level thereafter. 
These provisions may not be relevant to the Indian situation 
since a developing country which is a net· importer of the minerals 
produced from its continental shelf is exempt from making such 
payments. The demand for hydrocarbons in India will continue to 
outstrip domestic production in the forseeable future. Thus for all 
practical purposes the two texts are indistinguishable with regard to 
the exploitation of the resources on the continental shelf. 
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The other rights on the continental shelf are discussed 
together with the rights in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) . 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
Maritime Zones Act, 1976 
India has an EEZ which extends to 2 0 0  nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the Territorial Sea is drawn. 
Rights of India 
Within the EEZ India has/can 
a) sovereign rights for purposes of exploration, exploitation, 
conservation and management of living and non-living 
resources, and for producing energy from tides, winds, and 
'currents 
b) exclusive rights for the construction of artificial islands 
and installations, 
c) exclusive jurisdiction to authorize and control scientific 
research, 
d) exclusive jurisdiction to protect the marine environment and 
prevent pollution, 
e) declare any area a designated area for purposes of regulating 
entry into and passage through by foreign ships by specifying 
traffic separation schemes, and 
f) extend to any part same or similar restrictions as have been 
placed on any part of the territory of India. 
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Draft Treaty 
Part V of the Draft Treaty enumerates the rights of the 
coastal state in the exercise of which the coastal state shall have 
due regard to the rights of other states. I will compare the rights 
claimed under the 1976 act to see if they will be diminished or 
expanded under the Draft Treaty. With the exception of the right over 
living resources which are discussed first, all the other rights are 
common to the EEZ and the continental shelf and the following comments 
apply to both regions. 
(a) The coastal state has been given sovereign rights for the 
purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources. The coastal state has four classes of obligations 
corresponding to the rights over living resources. 
1 .  Duty to Conserve Stocks 
Article 61 enunciates the coastal state's duty to conserve. 
The coastal state shall determine the allowable catch and shall take 
appropriate measures to prevent overexploitation and restore 
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield. The coastal state and the relevant 
regional and global organizations shall cooperate as appropriate to 
this end. 
The Draft Treaty has taken a more informed position on 
conservation than the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation. The Geneva Convention referred only to optimum 
sustainable yield as a conservation method. The Draft Treaty refers 
to maintaining the maximum sustainable yield level qualified by 
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relevant environmental and economic factors, including the needs of 
coastal fishing communities, the special requirements of developing 
countries, fishing patterns and the interdependence of stocks. Thus 
the Draft Treaty provides guidelines for state practice on 
conservation based not merely on the biological aspects of fisheries 
but on the economic, social and environmental factors as well. The 
coastal state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the level of 
allowable catch. If living resources are endangered through the 
failure of the coastal state to take conservation measures, it will be 
obliged to submit to conciliation procedures. Conservation may impose 
onerous responsibilities to collect and exchange scientific 
information such as catch and fishing-effort statistics on each stock 
but, in the long run, such responsibilities will serve the interests 
of the coastal state. 
2. Duty of Optimum Utilization 
Article 62 describes the duty of the coastal state to ensure 
optimum utilization of the living resources. Where the coastal state 
does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it 
shall (not � as in the draft sponsored by India which emphasized 
complete exclusivity) allow other states to catch the surplus. 
The concept of full utilization was pressed by distant water 
fishing states which have considerable stake in continued access to 
stocks in the economic zone and believe that without such provisions 
many coastal states will exclude fishing by outsiders for 
nationalistic reasons. However, as long as coastal states are 
entitled to obtain payment from the users of surplus yields they have 
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an economic incentive to fully utilize the living resources within 
their economic zone. There is a basic difference between biological 
and mineral resources. Unexploited or underexploited fishery stocks 
do not accumulate to become available for future use of the coastal 
state and therefore represent a deadweight loss. 
In giving other states access to surplus stocks the coastal 
state shall be required to give special consideration to the needs of 
the landlocked states, the states with special geographical 
characteristics, other developing states in the region, and to 
minimize the dislocation in states which have traditionally fished in 
the area or which have made sustained efforts in research and 
identification of stocks. The Draft Treaty does not mention the order 
in which these candidates for surplus catch will be considered or the,
relative weight to be given to their needs. Nor is there any redress -,: 
for their grievances if a coastal state grants all the surplus of 
allowable catch exclusively on the basis of a particular factor. 
Distribution of the surplus catch among different categories of states' 
is left to the discretion of the coastal state. 
The coastal state can lay down terms for harvesting the 
surplus of allowable catch. These may relate to: payment of fees or 
transfer of technology, required conduct of specified fisheries 
research programs, placing of trainees on- board such vessels, landing 
of the catch in the ports of the coastal state, and terms and 
conditions relative to joint ventures, etc. The Draft Treaty provides 
a detailed list of such conditions most of which are relevant to 
developing states. Nationals of other states fishing in the EEZ are 
15 
required to comply with the conservation measures specified by the 
coastal state. 
The extent of discretion that the coastal state should enjoy 
in the EEZ was a subject of serious disagreement at the Conference. 
States who wanted compulsory and binding adjudication in case of 
dispute, felt that unless there were effective provisions for such 
settlement, the rights granted to them by the convention would amount 
to nought. Many states including the developing coastal states were 
opposed to any outside efforts to restrict their sovereign rights and 
they argued that their rights in the EEZ could not be effectively 
exercised if any state could harass them by frivolous invocation of 
the dispute settlement procedures. This was one of the 'hard core' 
issues that was resolved at the eighth session in the Conference in 
Geneva. The compromise provides that a coastal state would be obliged 
to submit to conciliation procedure in three categories of disputes: 
first, when living resources are endangered through the failure of the 
coastal state to take conservation measures which has already been 
mentioned; second, when there is an arbitrary refusal to determine the 
maximum allowable catch and the surplus that may be allocated to other 
states; and third, when a state arbitrarily refuses to allocate the 
surplus catch to anyone. 
Thus the coastal state is obligated to determine the allowable 
catch and the share thereof that it can harvest by its own capacity 
and to make the surplus available to those who may wish to harvest it. 
However it is useful to look at the imperatives of the coastal state 
that cannot be questioned. 
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1. If the maximum allowable catch is fixed at too high a level, 
the coastal state may be accused of not undertaking proper 
conservation measures but if it is fixed at too low a level, 
there is no redress. Thus the Draft Treaty permits coastal 
states to eliminate all surplus by setting the maximum 
allowable level sufficiently close to its own capacity to 
fish. 
2. A state may determine its own harvesting capacity at a higher 
level than may be the case. It is not always easy to 
determine catch levels. In countries with thousands of 
artisanal fishermen, estimates of catch are based on informed 
speculation at best. A state may intentionally or otherwis�, 
overestimate its harvesting capacity and thereby determine 
that it has a very small surplus to allocate to other states. 
The coastal state's estimates of its own harvesting capacity 
are not open to dispute by outsiders. 
3. For the purposes of the Draft Treaty, harvesting capacity of 
the coastal state may include the catch caught through 
collaborative international joint ventures. The Draft Treaty 
does not say that the catch has to be brought in solely by 
indigenous efforts. The term joint venture covers a multitude 
of different arrangements in which risks and profits are 
shared. A coastal state may enter into several joint ventures 
with foreign countries or companies that may considerably 
boost its own "harvesting capacity" and leave no surplus to be 
allocated to outsiders. If this article was included in the 
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Treaty to provide some legal safeguards for certain categories 
of states such as the landlocked or historically fishing 
nations, that purpose is unlikely to be achieved. On the 
other hand, if it was intended to ensure full utilization of 
the fishing resources it may have greater success. 
4. If a coastal state chooses to allocate its entire surplus to a 
single state its discretion cannot be challenged by other 
states which have not been allocated a share. 
5 .  The terms that the coastal state sets for allowing access to 
the surplus of the allowable catch by other states may not be 
challenged. In other words if a coastal state wished to 
exclude foreign fishing it could do so by simply demanding 
exorbitant payments which no state would be willing to pay. 
States do not have recourse to conciliation procedures if a 
coastal state were to impose prohibitive terms and conditions. 
The force of law is reflected not merely in those provisions 
which are subject to conciliation procedures -- international law 
would be a weak force indeed if that were the case -- but in the 
general norms of expectations and behavior it establishes. If we were 
to analyze the Draft Treaty to examine what a coastal state can get 
away with, the obligations do not seem very demanding. But if it is 
seen as reflecting the international consensus or the goal to be 
attained, the duty of full utilization would require considerable 
investment in collection of scientific information about the nature 
and size of the stocks, the number of vessels, fishermen and size of 
the catch and the administrative set up to issue and regulate 
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licenses. In most instances such obligations will be undertaken 
because they would mean not merely compliance with the Treaty but also 
because they would be beneficial to the country itself. Here the 
value of the stocks is important. If the stocks have a large market, 
rhetoric apart, the coastal state would not forgo the benefit of 
harvesting them and would attempt to capture these benefits either 
through joint ventures or by selling licensing permits to outsiders. 
If the stocks are not in great demand, outsiders are unlikely to be 
interested in harvesting them in which case the coastal state may not 
be under pressure to undertake the scientific and administrative 
efforts to determine the size of surplus and to allocate it. As 
stated above, a xenophobic state has many ways of disregarding this 
obligation, but most coastal stat2s will find it to their benefit to 
fully harvest the sustainable catch in their EEZ whether it is 
incorporated in their legislative act or not. 
3. Obligations Regarding Highly Migratory Species, Marine 
Mammals, Anadromous, Catadromous, Sedentary and Shared Stocks 
The Draft Treaty imposes special obligations on coastal states 
with regard to these stocks. The states in whose rivers anadromous 
stocks like salmon originate have been given special obligations and 
rights. Because the number of states involved in the fishing of 
anadromous stocks is small, the main arrangements will continue to be 
made by bilateral or multilateral agreements. Special rights and 
obligations have also been given to the coastal states in whose waters 
catadromous species such as eels spend the greater part of their life 
cycle. The right of international organizations to regulate and limit 
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the exploitation of marine mammals is not affected by the Draft 
Treaty. States have an obligation to cooperate to protect marine 
mammals. None of these are of direct interest to India. 
Sedentary species are organisms which at their harvestable 
stage are either immobile or are unable to move except in constant 
physical contact with the seabed and include lobsters, crabs, pearl 
oysters, pearl shells and sacred chanks. Sedentary species have 
relevance to India since there may be commercially exploitable stocks 
of these species in the Indian EEZ which are not currently being 
harvested. Sedentary species are considered resources of the 
continental shelf and not of the EEZ. This has two implications. 
First, the coastal state has sovereign rights over the sedentary 
species even beyond the EEZ since the continental shelf under Article 
76 may extend beyond 200 miles. Secondly, the coastal state has 
unqualified rights over the sedentary species without any obligation 
to share the surplus with other states unlike the other species 
mentioned in Part V of the Draft Treaty. 
The Draft Treaty subjects the fishing of tuna and other highly 
migratory species to regulations established by appropriate regional 
and international organizations. Tuna have extensive migratory 
patterns spanning many oceans and may swim inside and outside 200 
miles from shore. International arrangements for tuna have been in 
existence since 195 1. With the exception of skipjack, it is believed 
that all other species of tuna are being fished at the point of full 
utilization. While there is already economic waste due to 
overcommitment, there are other states who are starting new tuna 
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fleets or intend to do so in the near future. Thus there are two 
problems: first the adoption of global rational management measures 
and second, the allocation of benefits that is acceptable not only to 
the existing tuna fishing states but also to those who see themselves 
as prospective entrants. 
In view of the capital intensive nature of tuna fishing and 
the transoceanic migratory pattern of tuna, it may be desirable for 
India to cooperate with other states who harvest tuna in the Indian 
Ocean and international bodies like the Indo-Pacific Fisheries 
Council's Committee on Management of Tuna, irrespective of the 
exclusive right over all stocks in the 200-miles EEZ.7 
The Draft Treaty recognizes the need for coordinated 
conservation and allocation measures for transnational stocks or 
stocks that occur within the EEZ of two or more states. Conservation 
of shared stocks is much more complicated because in addition to total" 
allowable catch, an agreement has to be reached on separate national 
quotas, on different procedures for reaching national allocations and 
the enforcement of such measures by the states concerned. As stocks 
get harvested to the limit, bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
will be necessary for conservation and management either directly 
among the fishing states or through an appropriate regional 
organization. Ratification or non-ratification of the Treaty will not 
obviate the necessity of negotiations on shared stocks. 
4. Duty Towards Landlocked States and States with Special 
Geographical Characteristics 
Landlocked states and states with special geographical 
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characteristics (SSGC) shall have the right to part of the surplus 
from the EEZ of neighboring coastal states provided they pay the 
licensing fees and comply with the conservation measures. When there 
is no surplus, the concerned states shall by negotiations set up 
arrangements allowing the landlocked and SSGC a share in the EEZ of 
the coastal states in the region (Articles 69 and 70). 
The coastal states had taken the position at the Conference 
that issues of resource sharing are best settled on a bilateral basis. 
The argument of the landlocked and SSGC was that the EEZ does not 
conform to international law. By entering into a convention, the 
landlocked and SSGC give the coastal states a legal basis for a 200 
mile extension of jurisdiction over resources which deserves a quid 
pro quo, namely the right to participate in exploiting resources 
within that extended jurisdiction. Even though the rights of the 
landlocked and SSGC are hedged in with many qualifying caveats, it 
cannot be denied that the Treaty gives legal recognition to their 
share in the EEZ of the neighboring states. The obligation that these 
articles impose on a particular coastal state would vary greatly 
depending upon the capacity and tradition of ocean fishing in the 
landlocked or SSGC, their distance from the coast and the nature of 
the stocks in the EEZ. Still, a coastal state will have the upper 
hand in negotiations, the Draft Treaty notwithstanding. Determination 
of the amount of surplus by the coastal state cannot be challenged; 
consequently, a part of the surplus is a promise of uncertain 
resources as far as the landlocked and the SSGC are concerned. 
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How onerous will be the obligations of India under Articles 69 
and 70 if India ratifies the Treaty? There are no SSGC which have a 
claim on Indian EEZ. Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan are the landlocked 
states which can make a claim on the living resources (excluding 
sedentary species) in Indian EEZ as well as on other countries such as 
Pakistan and China. None of these landlocked countries have a 
significant marine fishing industry at the present time. They are 
unlikely to have great consumer demand for salt water fish either. In 
many inland parts of India, consumers prefer freshwater fish to ocean 
fish, if they find fish acceptable at all and the same will be true 
for Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan which are several hundred miles from 
the coast. Rights obtained by the landlocked states cannot be 
transferred to third parties through joint collaboration ventures, 
although the landlocked states can seek technical and financial 
assistance to build up their harvesting capacity. Bhutan, Nepal and 
Afghanistan may choose to negotiate with India for a share of the 
living resources, buy licenses, obtain technical assistance to train 
personnel, purchase facilities to freeze or can the catch and ship it 
a thousand miles inland or to external markets but the economics of it 
makes it unlikely that it will be a major claim on the Indian EEZ 
since these landlocked states can put foreign assistance to more 
productive use. Conceding the obligation to share the surplus in the 
EEZ with landlocked states which have a non-existent ocean fishing 
industry at the present time will detract very little from India's 
right to exclusive enjoyment of the resources. 
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(b) There is no significant difference in the 1976 Act and 
the Draft Treaty regarding the right of the coastal state to construct 
artificial islands and installations in the EEZ or the continental 
shelf. 
(c) The conduct of marine scientific research in the EEZ and 
the continental shelf had been the subject of a major controversy at 
UNCLOS III. The Draft Treaty gives the coastal state the right to 
authorize and regulate (not control) marine scientific research 
(Articles 246-255). The coastal state shall normally grant consent 
and consent will be implied if six months after the submission of 
information and compliance with conditions, consent is not denied. 
The coastal state can withhold consent if the proposed project is of 
direct relevance for exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources. The party wanting to conduct research must supply detailed 
information about the nature, objectives, methods, location and 
duration of the project and comply with conditions which would enable 
the coastal state to participate in the project and share the results, 
samples and data. Disputes regarding the interpretation and 
application of these provisions are largely exempt from the 
jurisdiction of any court or tribunal. While the Draft Treaty 
provides greater detail about how the coastal state can regulate 
marine scientific research in the EEZ and the continental shelf, the 
provisions are compatible with those of the 1976 Act. 
(d) The Draft Treaty gives the coastal states jurisdiction to 
prevent pollution. They have the obligation to establish rules which 
are not less effective than the international rules for controlling 
24 
pollution from dumping, from vessel discharges and from activities to 
explore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed. 
(e) Unlike the 1976 Act, the Draft Treaty does not mention 
the right of the coastal state to restrict navigation in the EEZ or in 
the superjacent waters of the Continental shelf in a single article. 
There are some reference to circumstances under which navigation may 
be regulated. Article 60 of the Draft Treaty states that the coastal 
state may establish safety zones around ar'tificial islands and 
structures provided they do not exceed a distance of 500 meters around 
them and provided they are not established in areas where interference 
may be caused to the use of recognized sealanes essential to 
international navigation. Exploitation of mineral resources may 
require regulation of seatraffic in order to protect drilling 
structures, pipelines and these would be covered by Article 60. 
Coastal states can take measures including presumably, 
regulation of sea traffic in order to protect their marine environment 
in cases of maritime casualty (Article 221). Acting through 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) or a 
general diplomatic conference, a coastal state may promote routing 
systems designed to minimize accidents. Additionally, if 
international standards are inadequate for clearly defined areas in 
the EEZ, the coastal state may present all scientific evidence to IMCO 
with whose approval within 12 months the coastal state may be allowed 
to establish sealanes in order to prevent pollution from vessels 
(Article 211). 
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The 1976 Act however reaches farther than the scattered 
references found in the Draft Treaty entitling a coastal state to 
regulate navigation in the EEZ. Under the 1976 Act, India could 
regulate traffic in parts of the EEZ which may not have anything to do 
with safety zones around installations or instances of maritime 
casualty. The Draft Treaty represents the balance between the 
guarantee of freedom of navigation in the EEZ and superjacent waters 
of the continental shelf as the price exacted for conceding the EEZ; 
any right of the coastal state to regulate navigation is carefully 
restricted to enumerated circumstances. Disputes arising from alleged 
interference by a coastal state with the freedom of navigation, 
,overflight and laying of submarine cables and pipelines are subject to 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the court and tribunal under the Draft 
Treaty (Article 296). The ratification of the Treaty will imply a 
more restrictive exercise of the right to regulate traffic in the EEZ 
,and the superjacent waters of the continental shelf than that embodied 
in the 1976 Act. 
(f) There is however no parallel for subsection 7 of Section 
7 and for Subsection 6 of Section 6 of the 1976 Act in the Draft 
Treaty. Under those provisions India may extend any enactment in 
force in any part of the territory of India to any part of the EEZ or 
the superjacent waters of the continental shelf as if the latter were 
a part of the former. This would presumably include restricting the 
movement and entry of all foreign vessels, aircraft and nationals or 
of those belonging to a particular country. It is totally open ended 
since it does not specify the circumstances or the duration for which 
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such an enactment will remain in force in the EEZ. No such right can 
be derived from any interpretation of the Draft Treaty. The Draft 
Treaty lays down that all states shall enjoy the freedom of navigation 
and overflight and freedom in the laying of cables and pipelines in 
the EEZ and in the continental shelf (Articles 58, 78 and 79). 
These sections of the 1976 Act are incompatible with the Draft 
Treaty and if applied after the Treaty comes into force will be deemed 
a violation of international law. 
On balance, a comparison of the rights and obligations of 
India under the 1976 Act and the Draft Treaty shows that under the 
latter, India cannot control navigation and overflight and its right 
to living resources are circumscribed by the obligation to undertake 
conservation, full utilization, to declare surplus and share it with 
the landlocked states and harvest the highly migratory species in 
cooperation with other states. We have already discussed above that 
none of the obligations regarding fishing will be contrary to India's 
long term interests and will not significantly detract from the 
exclusive enjoyment of the living resources in the EEZ. The right to 
control navigation and overflight will un questionably be eliminated 
and deserves closer scrutiny. 
What will be the implications of restrictions placed on 
passage of ships in the EEZs at the discretion of the coastal states 
for India? India's imports and exports in 1976 reached a total of 11 
billion dollars.8 On a worldwide basis, 90 percent of all trade is 
carried by ships. Assuming the same percentages holds true for her, 
India has a substantial stake in ensuring freedom of navigation, 
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untrann:neled by arbitrary decrees of coastal states. India may not 
have any intentions of placing unnecessary obstacles on trade routes 
and the provisions in the 1976 Act may be intended only as a measure 
of last resort to be used only in critical emergencies. But having 
incorporated such a provision, India will not be in a position to 
protest against similar provisions by other coastal states who may not 
be as reluctant to exercise them in an arbitrary fashion. As the 
tenth largest industrial country, India has more to lose than to gain 
by setting a precedent of placing restrictions on navigation. 
Will the Draft Treaty restrict her options if the foreign 
vessels pose a threat to India? India will not have the rights to 
prohibit a foreign_ warship from entering its EEZ with the avowed 
(though thinly disguised) purpose of brandishing military power and 
threatening the integrity of the country. It may be argued that 
Subsection 7 Section 7 of the 1976 Act is designed precisely for such 
'circumstances. Several responses are possible to this question. 
Perhaps we should ask if the 1976 Act will, as is being assumed, 
prevent the presence of ships that are clearly hostile to India? The 
1976 Act is a unilateral enactment; it either has to reflect the 
international consensus or has to be supported by military action in 
order to have any meaning. The Draft Treaty which reflects the 
international consensus does not favor restrictive passage in the EEZ. 
In other words, the non-ratification of the Treaty and the force of 
the 1976 Act would not be sufficient to keep the threatening warship 
out of the Indian EEZ unless India was willing to use force to back up 
its claim. The advantage of international law that is based on a 
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Treaty is that it is enforced by general acceptance among the nations. 
If India does not ratify the Treaty, it will nonetheless come into 
force when it is ratified by the requisite nlDllber of states. The 1976 
Act will be contrary to international law and Indian admonitions to 
the threatening ship to stay away will have little support in 
international law. Any action by force to repulse a foreign ship will 
be a violation of international law notwithstanding the 1976 Act. 
Politically it would be wise for a foreign ship to refrain from 
blackmail and making a show of force against another country but 
legally it will not be a violation of international law to use that 
country's EEZ for the purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The comparative analysis above indicates that the Maritime 
Zones Act, 1976 is largely compatible with the Draft Treaty. An 
important exception is the right under the 1976 Act to control 
navigation in the EEZ and the superjacent waters of the continental 
shelf which is not recognized by the Draft Treaty. However, as a 
large industrial nation, India's maritime interests will be better 
served by a regime which allows for unhampered navigation in the EEZs. 
In considering the ratification of the Treaty, one may be tempted to 
pick and choose among its more or less desirable features. But as I 
have mentioned earlier, the Treaty will be an integrated whole in 
which each element has been carefully balanced against others through 
compromise among the diverse interests of states. Each state must 
either ratify or reject the whole package. 
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The Treaty will confer substantial advantages to India. A 
unilateral action such as the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 has to rely on 
force for compliance. A Treaty lightens the burden of enforcement 
since states consider themselves duty bound to observe a Treaty that 
they have agreed to. The Treaty will create a new international 
oceans regime that will bring greater order and predictability in the 




1. See the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section I, New 
Delhi, August 26, 1976. 
2. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3.Sept. 2 2, 1980.
3. Quoted in Donat Pharand The Law of the Sea and the Arctic, 
Ottawa, 1973: 7. 
4. Philip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime 
Jurisdiction, New York, 1927: 1 20. 
5. C. John Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, David McKay, 
New York, 1967: 261. 
6. Myres McDougal and William Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1962: 220.
7. For a more detailed discussion see, Manjula Shyam, "The Emerging 
Fisheries Regime: Implications for India. " Ocean Development and 
International Law Journal 8, No. 1, 1980: 48-52.
8. United Nations Office of Statistics. Statistical Yearbook. 
United Nations, 1979.
